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We measure the competitive effect of public ownership of banks in 
concentrated local banking markets in Brazil by extending Bresnahan 
and Reiss’s [1991] framework to measure the effects of entry in 
concentrated markets. We use variation in market size, the number of 
competitors and their identity to infer how conduct is affected by the 
entry of a private vis-à-vis a public bank. We find that, while local 
markets whose structure is private bank duopoly are 100% larger than 
private monopolies, duopolies with one public and one private bank 
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These results suggest that, while the presence of private banks 
toughens competition, public banks do not affect conduct. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Despite widespread privatization in 1980s and 1990s, the public sector still owned 
roughly 40% of banking sector assets worldwide in 1995 (La Porta et al (2002)). In some 
countries, notably in Latin America and South-East Asia, this figure is higher (Levy-
Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2004)). In this context of significant state ownership, the 
banking sector is a good setting for studying the benefits of public versus private 
operation of firms.  
The literature has suggested several roles for public bank.
1 Financial 
intermediation, public or private, exists to mitigate problems of informational asymmetry 
and contract incompleteness (Gorton and Winton (2002)). Public ownership, insofar as it 
alleviates the pressure for profitability, could induce banks to lend to borrowers whose 
return is socially (but not privately) positive. Two different examples of this phenomenon 
could be long-term finance by development banks, and some of the state led examples of 
short-term microcredit.
 2  A third potential role of public banks is to induce a more 
competitive conduct in the banking industry. Although this could be true in any industry, 
state ownership in banking is significant (perhaps because of the reasons outlined above), 
and an increased performance of the banking sector can have important spillover effects 
on other sectors. This is exactly the empirical question we address in this paper, using 
data on local concentrated markets in Brazil: does the presence of public bank induce 
competition in local banking markets? 
Brazil is good candidate for an empirical setting to measure competitive effect of 
public banks. First, both public and private ownership of bank assets co-exist in Brazilian 
commercial banking industry, and both are significant.
3 Even after the privatization of 
                                                 
1 We use the term public banks meaning the more precise but longer term state-owned banks. Public here 
should not be confounded with a publicly held bank, i.e., a bank whose stocks are negotiated publicly.  
2 One example is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), established by the 
government of Thailand to improve access to credit to small farmers. See for example Ahlin and Townsend 
(2003). 
3 Co-existence of public and private banks is not specific to Brazil. Argentina is another good example: The 
largest and third largest commercial banks (Banco La Nación and Banco de La Provincia de Buenos Aires) 
are owned by the federal government and by the province of Buenos Aires, respectively. There are several 
other important provincial banks. However, dollarization and the subsequent convertability crisis of 
December 2001, which almost destroyed the banking system, turn Argentina into a bad candidate 
comparing to Brazil.   3
state-level public banks, they still held 42.7% of the banking sector assets nationally in 
2001 (Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2004)).
4 The federal government controls the 
two largest commercial banks, Banco do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal, and 
a large development bank, BNDES, which until recently was the major (if not the only) 
source of long-term finance in the country. 
   A second reason is variation in the local bank market structure according to type 
of ownership (private versus public). Because of privatization, local private monopolies 
and duopolies, which are rare in countries where public banks are important, now can be 
observed. This variation in structure by ownership is crucial for the success of an 
empirical attempt to measure whether public ownership of banks have a pro-competitive 
benefit. 
Another reason lies in the structure and performance of the Brazilian banking 
industry. The market at the national level is quite concentrated. The share of deposits in 
the five largest banks in 2004 was 55%, while the share of the three largest was 42.6%. 
Local markets are, not surprisingly, even more concentrated. Among cities with less than 
50,000 inhabitants, the C5 is, on average, 99.9% and the C3 is, on average, 98.5%
5. 
Performance is short of stellar. Spreads on corporate loans were at an average of 67.9% 
per year over the 2000-2004 period. On consumer loans they were even higher, 123.7% 
per year (Banco Central do Brasil (2005)). Structure and performance suggest the 
possibility of a conduct problem, i.e., excessive market power.
6 Thus, it would be 
reasonable to imagine that the government would use its large presence in the banking 
                                                 
4 We mean banks whose controllers are the states. Privatization of state-level public banks occurred under a 
federally sponsored program, Programa de Incentivo à Redução da Presença do Estado na Atividade 
Bancária (almost literally, it translates to program to stimulate the reduction of the public sector presence in 
banking activity) which consisted of intervention by the banking regulator (the central bank), recovery and 
privatization. 
5 From the 2957 towns that had less than 50,000 inhabitants in 2004, only 61 towns (2%) had more than 5 
banks in their market and only 564 (16%) had more than three banks, 2896 (98%) had 5 banks or less and 
2476 (84%) had three banks or less. The minimum C5 observed in towns with less than 50,000 was 85% 
and the minimum C3 observed was 62%. The figures do not change much when we look at towns with less 
than 100,000 inhabitants. 
6 Just as an illustration, in 2005, Bradesco, the largest private bank in Brazil, had some $5.5 billion in 
profits, which implied a return on equity of 32%. This is twice the average return for European and 
American commercial banks. Other large private banks have similar returns. See “High Living,” The 
Economist, May 18
th, 2006. As usual, other factors can partially account for the high observed spreads on 
loan. Reserve requirement, taxation and cross-subsidies to earmarked loans are the other culprits.   4
sector to induce competition. Or is it that poor performance is caused by this large 
presence? These are, in short, the questions we can address using Brazilian data.  
Our empirical methodology is an extension of Bresnahan and Reiss´s (1991) (BR 
hereafter) framework for measuring the effect of entry in concentrated markets.   
Similarly to BR, we use variation on market size and the number of competitors to infer 
the effect of entry on conduct in concentrated markets. The basic idea is as follows: 
assuming free entry, profits must equal the fixed cost of entry in a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of a game of entry-then-competition.
7 Profits depend, among other things, on 
two observable variables, number of firms and market size, and, as usual, several 
unobservable ones, including conduct. Markets of similar sizes but with different number 
of firms must have different equilibrium profits. If the demand factors and variable costs 
(the “other things” that determine profits) are properly accounted for, this variation in the 
number of firms can be attributed to differences in conduct. More specifically, imagine 
that markets with two firms are much larger than markets with one firm, but markets with 
three firms are not so much larger than markets with two firms. In this case, one infers 
that while the entry of a rival in a monopoly market has a large impact on conduct, the 
effect of the third firm is not so pronounced. 
A major advantage of the BR approach it that it is very economical on data. There 
are only two strict requirements: observing the number of banks operating in the market, 
and having a measure of market size. This is very important for several reasons. First and 
foremost, accounting data (revenues, cost, profits) are almost never observed, and even 
when they are available it is unclear whether one should trust self-reported profit data.
8 
First and foremost, even if one trusts accounting data on profits, it is all but impossible to 
have profits disaggregated at the local level. Second, price and cost data are not always 
(in fact, normally) not available at the relevant market level. Finally, although quantity 
data may be available locally, it is not clear how one should aggregate different types of 
loans or deposits. BR bypasses these problems, at a relative low cost: after properly 
                                                 
7 This a two-stage game with N players (with N arbitrarily large). In the first stage, the N potential entrants 
decide to enter or not, incurring in a fixed cost CF if they enter. In the second stage the, the N
E who entered 
play some oligopoly game. 
8 In fact, it is already the standard in the New Empirical Industrial Organization literature to be suspicious 
of accounting data.   5
defining the relevant local market and observing the number of suppliers at the relevant 
local market, one only needs two weak assumptions: free-entry.
9  
In contrast to BR, the identity of the entrant matters in our application. We are 
interested how entry by a public bank affects conduct compared to the impact of entry by 
a  private bank. This difference is interpreted as the “competitive” effect of public 
ownership of banks.  
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of public ownership of banks on 
conduct is ambiguous. On the one hand, public banks may have a goal other than profit 
maximization: consumer surplus could be part of their objective function. On the other 
hand, public and private banks may offer differentiated services. Imagine a market with 
two banks, one private and one public. While crowding out entry by other private banks, 
the presence of a public bank may be horizontally differentiated from the private bank. 
Relative to a situation in which there are two private banks, competitive aggressiveness is 
attenuated. Finally, cost differences in the operation of public and private banks may 
affect conduct. Political, not economic, reasons may motivate entry by a public bank. For 
managerial, organizational or technological reasons, private and public banks may 
operate with different cost structures. In this, equilibrium profits in a market with two 
private banks are different from equilibrium profits in market with one public and one 
private bank.  
Our results suggest that public ownership of banks adversely impacts conduct. 
While supporting a private duopoly demands a much larger market size than a private 
monopoly, a larger market is not necessary to support a private/public duopoly. We 
estimate that, compared to the minimum market size necessary to support a private 
monopoly, the minimum size needed to support a second private bank is 1.75 times as 
large.  In contrast, the minimum size is unaffected by entry of a rival public bank. While 
entry by a private bank reduces profits and markets have to be larger to cover the same 
amount of fixed costs, entry by a public bank has no impact on profits and, therefore, 
market sizes remain unchanged.  
                                                 
9 Free-entry is not “entry free of charge”: sunk and fixed costs of entry are a big part of the story here. Free-
entry means that anyone can enter, implying that profits are driven down to zero in any sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of the game described in footnote 7.   6
Although privatization transferred a significant amount of assets to the private 
sector, public and private ownership still co-exist in other industries as well. In Brazil, 
fuel distribution is another example. While the banking sector has specificities that make 
it difficult to generalize any result to other industries, our results are indicative about the 
impact of public ownership on competition on other industries. Given the current trend in 
some countries (most notably Venezuela and Bolivia) towards increasing participation of 
the public sector in some industries, our results suggest further investigation on the 
(possibly) adverse effects of nationalization of companies on competition.    
  The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the data and present 
some summary statistics. The empirical strategy is outlined in section III.. Section III also 




II. Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
We use two databases: the first gives information on local bank market structure 
at the town level, and the second provides town demographic characteristics. Local bank 
market structure data comes from Central Bank of Brazil, a database called ESTBAN 
(Banking Statistics). This dataset contains information about the number of branches that 
each Brazilian bank has on each Brazilian town. The main dependent variable in the 
empirical procedures is the number of different private and public banks in a town. In all 
procedures, we use a cross-section of towns of December of 2000, the year for which 
demographic characteristics are available from the 2000 census. We use town-level 
information on adult population and per capita income. The market size is measured by 
multiplying these two variables.    
Differently from BR, which measure size by population, our measure of market 
size is adult population multiplied by income per capita (that is, total income).
10 Brazilian 
cities can be quite poor, and income per capita varies wildly across cities. Since banking 
                                                 
10 We also model the market à la BR, as a function of  population, populational growth and the number of 
inhabitants that commute in and out of the city. Results are very similar. For robustness we change the 
market size to be the total income of those who earn more that three minimum wages.   7
services tend to be a superior good, it is important that the measure of size contains 
income: a town with a large population but with low income may not be profitable 
enough for a private bank to enter.
11  
The sample is composed of all towns that are not part of any metropolitan areas. 
The reason for excluding metropolitan areas is measurement of the relevant banking 
market. A client of a bank in the main city (where she works, for example) may well live 
in another city that is part of the same metropolitan area. Another reason to eliminate 
metropolitan areas is that, similarly to BR, the competitive effects are more relevant in 
relatively concentrated markets, i.e., smaller towns.   
The main idea and results of the paper can be seen in tables 1 and 2, which show 
some summary statistics on towns’ characteristics. Cities are divided into groups 
according to the total number of banks, the number of private, and the number of public 
banks operating in the town.  
First important thing that emerges from table 1 is that adult population alone is a 
poor measure of scale. Population varies less than desired across groups. Since decision 
entry should depend on income, as well population, we chose to measure size of markets 
by total income (population times income per capita). For robustness, the total income of 
those who earn more than three minimum wages are also used as a measure of market 
size.
12 Inspection of table 1 also shows that, as expected, population and total income are 
positively related to the number of banks operating in the market. In fact, in both cases 
the relationship is monotonic, although much more pronounced for total income. This is 




                                                 
11 One might wonder whether the relevant total income at the hands of those who have some money, since 
banking services should be a superior good at low levels of income. Since income distribution between and 
within cities in Brazil is very high, using total income could be misleading in the sense that, for a given 
level of income, the size of more unequal cities would be overblown. To assess whether this can affect our 
results in a significant way, we also run our models with market size defined as total income of those who 
earn more than 3 minimum wages, arriving at very similar results (There is nothing particularly special 
about 3 minimum wages, except that two high ranked bank executives (from Itaú and Bradesco) reported to 
one of the authors (Mr. De Mello) that they start targeting people at this level of income.) 
12 See footnote 12. Changing the definition to 2, 4 or 5 minimum wages (the three that we attempted) does 
not change results meaningfully. For conciseness we omit the results, which are available upon request.   8
 
 







Total income: 3 
minimum wages
0 2056 4219 116 704051 319043
1 1334 6920 163 1479093 790816
2 559 10558 192 2802839 1698663
3 306 14356 210 4259284 2726715
4 224 18481 236 6088673 4040166
5 162 27351 250 9468834 6482181
>5 321 74706 311 36300000 28300000
Total 4962 12243 165 4203181 2929745
Table 1:  Town Characteristics, by number of banks
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (number of banks) and 2000 Census(adult population,income per
capita, total income and total income above 3 minimum wages). Number of banks is the amount of
different banks in each town. Income per capita is monthly and measured in R$ of 2000. Total income
is the total monthly income of the adult population of the town. Total income above 3 minimum wages
is the total income of adults that had income above 3 minimum wages in 2000. 
 
 
Differences across markets with public banks and markets without public banks 
are depicted in table 2. The first noticeable thing is that private monopolies are smaller 
than public monopolies, regardless of whether market size is measured by total income or 
by total income of those who earn more than 3 minimum wages. While this is intriguing 
if public banks were fulfilling a role of boosting the development of small places, it is 
compatible with the interpretation that public face higher operating costs, as we shall see 
in section III. Inspection of the table shows some other interesting results. Private 
duopoly markets are almost twice of the size of private monopoly markets (98% larger). 
In contrast, markets with one public bank and one private bank are less than double the 
size of public monopoly markets (83% larger). When one compares public duopolies to 
public monopolies the increase in size is even less pronounced (only 60%). In general, 
the descriptive statistics suggest that private banks are willing to enter in smaller markets 
when the competitor is a public bank, which would indicate that public banks are anti-  9
competitive.  In section III, we model the (equilibrium) decision to be present at a market, 







# obs Adult Population Income per capita Total Income
Total income: 3 
minimum wages
0 0 2056 4219 116 704051 319043
1 0 644 5013 175 1248186 706267
0 1 690 8700 151 1694606 869730
2 0 41 7848 209 2422345 1538200
1 1 277 10228 204 2991379 1877827
0 2 241 11398 175 2650867 1520034
3 0 4 11920 281 5148405 3824287
0 3 73 17789 181 4165787 2409891
2 1 126 11810 226 4147927 2818520
1 2 103 15132 208 4427244 2796329
0 4 8 32414 99 5579006 2604738
3 1 17 14897 268 6163945 4453611
1 3 61 20715 235 6572511 4288537
2 2 138 17128 241 5895076 3962661
483 58823 291 27300000 21000000
4962 12243 165 4203181 2929745
Table 2: Town Characteristics, by number of public and private banks
Number of banks >4
Whole sample
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (number of banks) and 2000 Census (adult population,income per capita, total
income and total income above 3 minimum wages). Number of banks is the amount of different banks in each town.
Income per capita is monthly and measured in R$ of 2000. Total income is the total monthly income of the adult
population of the town. Total income above 3 minimum wages is the total income of adults that had income above 3




III. Empirical strategy and Identification Assumptions  
 
 
Following BR, the empirical strategy consists of exploring variation on market 
size and the number of banks in a local market to identify the effect of entry on conduct.  
Let  ( ) ε π , , , , X N N S pri pub  be gross profits (before subtracting fixed costs) for a 
local market. Profits are function of four observables, and ε, which contains all 
                                                 
13 In fact, suggestion may be misleading. Public-Private duopolies are larger than pure private duopolies, 
for example. The results from formal model estimation will help decide between these (seemingly) 
contradictory results.    10
unobservables that affect city-level bank profits. The observable variables are the size of 
the market (S), and the number of public bank and private banks with operations in the 
local market, priv pub N N   and   , respectively, and a vector of demand and supply shifter that 
affect profits at the local level. In the specifications, X will include variables such as 
income and income distribution, which affect price-cost margin, insofar as it shifts the 
demand; and the regions of the country, which should affect the fixed cost of operating 
on local bank markets.
14 An important unobservable variable is conduct, i.e., the level of 
competitiveness in the market, holding the market fixed. This is ultimately what we will 
estimate. 
For the vast majority of models of rivalry, and for the majority of reasonable 
demand systems, the profit function has the following characteristics: 
 
( ) ε π , , , , X N N S pri pub  increases with S, and decreases with, Npub and Npriv        (1) 
 
All other unobserved effects are captured in ε, which include demand factors and 
cost shifters not included in X. Let N = Npub + Npri and let FCN be the fixed cost of 
operating in a local market with N banks, the free-entry number of private banks in 
equilibrium is the largest integer that satisfies the following condition
15: 
 
                                                ( ) N priv pub FC N N S ≥ ε π , , ,                                               (2) 
   
Since we are unsure as to the nature of optimization problem of public banks, we 





                                                 
14 Bank executives say that, in the Northeast and North parts of the country, it is notoriously more difficult 
to recruit sufficiently qualified personnel for positions such as loan officer and account manager.  
15 While profits gross of fixed costs do depend on the identity (public versus private) of banks, there is an 
implicit assumption that the fixed cost of operating on given city does not depend on the identity of the 
bank.    11
III.A Exogenous Public Bank presence 
 
We first assume entry by public banks is exogenous, in the sense that they do not 
base their decision on (1). Entry by public banks may have motivations other than 
economic, such as the establishment of a political base and local development.
16 If their 
presence is exogenous, the effect of public banks on local market profitability can be 
inferred by comparing the predicted sizes of markets according to the number of public 
banks in the markets. For an illustration consider S11 and S20 solve the following two 
equations     
                               ( )
() N priv pub
N priv pub
FC N N S





, 2 , 0 ,
, 1 , 1 ,
20
11
                                   (3) 
If a duopoly with a one public bank is larger than duopoly with two private banks 
(S11 > S20), then (2) implies that public banks are pro-competitive, because it takes a 
larger market to produce the same amount of profits. Generally, let i stand for the number 
of private banks, and j index the number of public banks in a local bank market. We are 
interested in comparing Sij and Si+1 j-1 for i ≥ 1 and j≥ 1.  
The ideal experiment would be the following. Start with two identical cities, A 
and  B. In city A the incumbent (monopolist) is a public bank (Ipub), in city B the 
incumbent is private (Ipri). There is a potential private entrant (Epri). Now imagine we 
double size of the two cities, and call this new size 2S (they were identical, and therefore 
they have the same sizes). Suppose we observe that Epri decide to enter in city B, where 
the private bank is incumbent, but not in A, where the public bank is incumbent. This is 
evidence that the public bank is pro-competitive. Why? Epri revealed a preference 
towards entering against a private competitor, which shows that he anticipates making 
money against the private competitor but not the public one. Everything else constant, it 
must be that competition will be tougher against the public competitor.
17 In other words: 
                                                 
16 The expansion of Banco do Brasil branch network in Northeast region during the late 1970s is attributed 
to the military government’s strategy to solidify a conservative political base in the most backward part of 
the country, in anticipation to democratization. Another evidence of motives besides profit is the strong 
presence of the public banks of earmarked loans to real estate (CAIXA) and agricultural loans (Banco do 
Brasil), which generally are money losers. See Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2004) for a survey on the 
theoretical reasons why a public bank would not maximize profits. 
17 The reverse would also be true, evidently.   12
 
( ) ( ) ε π ε π , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 2 2 = = > > = priv pub priv N N S FC N S  
 
In this perfect experiment, all the demand and cost shifter in ε and accounted for. 
Therefore, the only thing that could be different is conduct, another component of ε. 
Unfortunately, this ideal experiment is not available in general (if ever). While the 
ideal experiment has a time-series flavor (increase the market size of a city), our 
adaptation of BR is a method for emulating the ideal experiment by using cross-section 
variation in city sizes at one point in time (the year 2000), as outlined now.
18 
Differences in estimated market sizes are only interpretable as evidence of 
differences in conduct if: i) unobservable factors that affect profits, ε, do not vary 
systematically with Npub and Npri. The error term contains, for example, demand and cost 
shifters other than income and income inequality. If public banks are present in markets 
in which the demand for banking services is particularly high (or in markets that are more 
costly to service), results would be biased towards finding an adverse effect of public 
banks on conduct. Empirically, however, this does not seem to be the case in our sample. 
Public bank presence is widespread. Looking at table 2, one sees that public banks are in 
cities where the income per capita (which is controlled for in our specifications) is 
slightly lower, but the population is somewhat larger. These differences, however, do not 
seem very pronounced. In fact, public banks presence, after accounting for income, 
income inequality and the regions of the country, is likely to be exogenously determined. 
In fact, if anything, private banks tend to shy away from markets where demand is low, 
and cost of servicing is high. After (somewhat) controlling for cost of servicing by 
                                                 
18 ESTBAN, the central bank data on the number of competitors in the local markets in available for years 
other than 2000 (it goes back to the 1980s, and the latest available year is 2005). City-level market size, 
however, can only be computed with census data, which is decennial. Therefore adding other years would 
be “more of the same”, since there would be no variation in market size. Worse than that, since city 
definitions have changed over the 1990s and 2000s (mostly because after the 1998 constitution allowed 
districts to leave a city), additional years can be bad variation. Another approach would be using the year 
1991, when the previous census was administered. In 1991, however, Brazil was under hyperinflation, 
which could affect banks’  entry decisions significantly (in an hyperinflationary environment, banks could 
stay in a city only for deposit recruitment reasons, in order to acquire revenues from inflationary floating.)   13
including regional dummies, the presence of public banks (Npub ), if anything, should bias 
results towards finding that public banks are pro-competitive.
19 
Let k be a bank market (city). To estimate Sjj and Si+1 j-1, we impose structure on 
relation (1):    
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Sk is the size of market k (as measured by total income), 
k
pub N  and 
k
pri N  are the 
number of public and privates banks in market k, respectively. Xk includes income and 
income distribution in market k. 
k
m D  is a set dummies for the number of private banks in 






otherwise    0,
market    in the   banks   private   least  at    is    there if   , 1 1 k m
Dm  
 
α2 is the entry effect of the second bank; α3 is the third bank entry effect and so 
on. Sij is market size in market k. 
Different fixed costs for different number of private banks in the market are 
introduced by allowing (4) to have different intercepts. Net profits in market k are:  
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 are dummies similar to 
k
m D  except that they refer to the total number of banks, 
not the number of private banks. The γs measure differences in fixed costs: γ1 is the fixed 
cost in a monopoly market, γ1 + γ2 is the fixed cost in the duopoly market, and so on. 
                                                 
19 Since public banks are in less profitable places for unobservable reason, markets in which public banks 
are present will be larger than otherwise would be were these other unobservables accounted for. Since 
larger markets mean more competition, public banks would “induce competition”.    14
Finally, the parameter β measures the competition effect of the presence of public 
banks. We are interested in comparing this effect with the private bank competition effect 
(the α s.) 
We implicitly assume homogeneity across private banks: two private banks in a 
town have the same profit. This assumption buys uniqueness of the equilibrium number 
of private banks. There is a large literature discussing issues of multiplicity in this kind of 
setting.
20 If we were to consider heterogeneous agents in a general way, the number of 
firms in equilibrium is not unique, and multiplicity would have to be dealt with explicitly. 
We are not interested in measuring the effect on conduct of different private banks (or 
different public banks), but only how public banks in general differ from private banks. 
Allowing for heterogeneity among private banks would introduce unnecessary 
complexity, and we decided to treat private bank 1 and private bank 2 as 
undistinguishable. Public banks, however, are treated differently: what motivates their 
entry decision is unknown, and assumed to be exogenous with respect to profit. Both 
development and political view of public bank ownership would predict that public bank 
decision will be based on other social or political criteria.
21 
An ordered probit is estimated. Assuming entry does not dampen competition, the 
monopoly profits are no smaller than the duopoly profit, duopoly profits are no smaller 
than the profit with three competitors, and so on. The following inequalities are true:  
 
                                                      L ≥ ≥ ≥ 3 2 1 π π π                                                   (6) 
 
  Assuming that the error term ε in the net profit equation (5) follows a standard 
normal distribution, the probability of observing markets with no banks equals:  
 
                                               ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 0 Pr 0 Pr π π Φ − = < = = pri N         
where  () • Φ  is the normal cumulative distribution and  ε π π + = . 
The probability of observing a monopoly is: 
                                                 
20 See for example Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Berry (1992), Seim (2002), Mazzeo(2002), Tamer (2003) 
and  Cilliberto and Tamer (2006). Berry and Tamer (2007) is a good survey of this literature.  
21 See Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2004).   15
 
                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 2 0 Pr 1 Pr π π π π Φ − Φ = < < = =
t
pri N                         
 
In general, the probability of observing a market with N private banks firms is:  
 
                               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 Pr Pr + Φ − Φ = < < = = N N N N pri priv N N π π π π                       (7) 
These probabilities define a likelihood function:  
 
        () () () () () ∏
=






pri pri N N N N
1
1 π π                                    (8) 
 
where K is the total number of cities in our sample. The estimated parameters (5) are the 
maximands of (8).  
As BR put, ideally one would have enough time-series variation so that the same 
market would fluctuate in size to produce enough variation in the number of firms. As in 
BR, we do not have this type of variation, so we emulate this ideal experiment by using 
cross-section variation in market size and number of banks. An observation is a local 
market in December 2000. Table 3 presents the results. 






























* = significant at the 10% level
Source: Banco Central do Brasil and 2000  
Ordered probit estimates of the model (5), robust standard 
deviations in parentheses
Gini
*** = significant at the 1% level
















Start with column (1), where results of the estimates of model (5) are shown, but 
Xk is omitted.  All coefficients have the expected signs. αs are all negative, meaning that 
more banks in a market of a given size is associated with lower profits. Except for α5 all   17
of them are statistically significant. The absolute value of the parameters falls as the 
number of banks in a market increases, which is expected since the effect of bank entry 
on conduct should be lower when there already are several competitors in the market.
22  
The point estimates of the parameters that measure fixed costs (the γs) are positive 
and statistically significant for the first three of them. This means that fixed costs increase 
as the number of competitors increase. This is reasonable because there are inputs 
specific to banking, such as skills in finance, which are harder to recruit for an entrant 
than for the incumbent banks.  
Finally, the estimate of the parameter β: the estimated coefficient is negative (and 
statistically significant), meaning that public banks reduce industry profits, and 
suggesting that the presence of public banks have increases competition. However, the 
competitive effect of public banks is small in magnitude. Comparing β ˆ  with the the 
estimated effects of private banks (the α’s), one sees that the effect of the presence of a 
public bank on profits is weaker than the effect of the first three private entrants (α2, α3 
and α4), but slightly stronger than the effect of the fifth private entrants (α5).
23 Therefore, 
the presence of a public, in terms of competition, is roughly equivalent the presence of 
the fifth private bank. 
In column (2), Xk is introduced. All estimates are very similar to those in column 
(1). IThe only noticeable thing is the estimates on income and income distribution. As 
one would expect, price-cost margin is higher in richer cities (where the demand schedule 
should be outwards), and, for a given level of income, lower where income distribution is 
more unequal. 
With estimates of the parameters in the profit function (5), one can compute the 
minimum efficient market size to support a given number of private and public banks (the 
Sij defined above). For example imagine two situations: one public bank and one private 
bank (i =1, j = 1), and two private banks in the market (i = 2 and j = 0). The estimated 
minimum size (averaged over the sample) implied by (5) are: 
 
                                                 
22 BR estimate that once the market has from three to five competitors, entry has little effect on conduct. 
23 This is true because we assumed linearity of the effect of the public bank entry. Since only very few 
cities in the sample have more than 2 public banks, the issue of non-linearity is less serious.   18


















































































If, as in BR, population was used as the size variable, this ratio would represent 
the minimum population per bank necessary to support a given equilibrium. This is the 
break even population, the minimum amount of population per bank that guarantees non-
negative profits for all banks in the market. In our case, the measure of scale is the adult 
population multiplied by per capita income, which is approximately the total income of 
the town.
24 Table 4 has the estimated (average) minimum scale per bank for different 
market structures. 
                                                 
24 A simple example helps to illustrate the point. In a Cournot model with linear demand and quadratic cost, 
the minimum efficient scale per bank in a market with two banks is higher than the minimum efficient scale 
in a market with one bank. If the monopoly and duopoly minimum scale per bank were the same, this 
would be evidence of cartel. This occurs because, if the entry of a bank increases competition, rational 
banks anticipate that after the entry of the second bank the profit will be less than in monopoly, which 
means that the scale with two banks has to be higher than the scale in monopoly given the linearity of 
demand. In other words, if there are competition effects with the entry of a second bank in a monopoly 
market, then the total scale of the market with two banks has to be more than double of the scale in the 
monopoly market.       19
s 10
0.08
s 20 s 11
0.18 0.06
s 30 s 12 s 21
0.21 0.05 0.13
s 40 s 13 s 22 s 31
0.23 0.05 0.10 0.13
Table 4: Minimum efficient scales*
* s ij - minimum efficient scale with i private and j public banks. Minimum scales computed 
from estimates in table 3, second column (Model with demand Control). Income and income 
distribution evaluated at the mean values.
 
 
  Numbers in the table 4 (and all subsequent tables) that contain minimum efficient 
scales should be read as follows. To facilitate computing the model, to income was 
divided by 10
7. In table 4, a monopoly threshold of 0.08 means that the minimum total 
monthly income for a bank serve a town is of R$800,000, in 2000 reais.  
Table 4 shows that the minimum efficient scale per bank is higher when a private 
bank enters a market than a public one enters, at least in the more concentrated markets. 
Before we start, notice that, as expected, the private duopoly occur on markets that are, 
on average, larger than markets in which the structure is a private monopoly (s20 > s10).  
s20 (0.18) is much larger than s11 (0.06), meaning that the minimum efficient scale 
with two private banks is much larger than the minimum scale to support one private and 
one public bank. Similarly, the minimum efficient scale in a market with three private 
banks (s30) is higher than the minimum efficient scales in markets with three banks and 
that have at least one public bank (s12 and s21). Therefore, in markets with at most three 
banks, the effect of entry by private banks is higher than public banks’ effects. In markets 
with more than three banks (among private and public), the competitive effect of entry is 
indistinguishable between public and private banks. These results suggest that, at least in 
concentrated markets, entry by private banks induce a stronger effect on competition than 
entry by public banks. The following sub-sections contain some sensitivity analysis. 
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Robustness 1: Regional Effects 
 
There is regional heterogeneity in the importance of public banks in local bank 
markets. Public banks are more important in the Northeast region, the poorest and most 
unequal region in the country, and in the North region, the least populated. Thus, public 
bank presence is more likely to be exogenous after controlling for regional effects. For 
example, poorer towns are less profitable, and public bank presence may capture this 
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Northeastern towns are the omitted category. Table 5 present the estimated 
parameters of model (8).  




























































Table 5: Exogenous public banks with 
regional dummies
Source: Banco Central do Brasil and 2000  Census. 
*** = significant at the 1% level
* = significant at the 10% level
** = significant at the 5% level
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Results in table 5 show that estimates in table 3 are robust to controlling for 
regional effects: estimated coefficients on the effects of public and private banks on 
price-cost margin are all but similar to those in both columns of table 3. Estimated 
coefficients suggest that, after controlling for income and income distribution, different 
region in the country do no have different price-cost margins (all κs are not different from 
zero).  Nevertheless, there is a clear ranking of fixed cost of operation: the North in the 
most expensive region to launch a banking operation (λ3 = 1.22), followed by the 
Northeast (the omitted category), then the Centerwest (λ4 = - 0.52), the South (λ2 = - 0.70) 
and the Southeast (λ1 = - 1.12). This matches perfectly the belief in the industry and the 
intuition on where fixed costs should be high. The North in the farthest region 
economically, and the least developed. The Northeast follows. The Centerwest is the 
center region, midway in terms both geographically and economically. The South has the 
best social indicators but economic activity is much more dynamic in the Southeast, the 
main economic region of the country. Table 6 shows the associated thresholds for the 
minimum scales. 
 
Northeast Southeast South North Centerwest
s 10 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.08
s 20 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.31 0.19
s 30 0.27 0.17 0.21 0.32 0.21
s 40 0.29 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.23
s 11 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.06
s 12 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05
s 13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05
s 21 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.13
s 22 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.10
s 31 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.13
Table 6: Minimum efficient scales by region 
* s ij - minimum efficient scale with i private and j public banks. Minimum 
scales computed with etimates in table 5.
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Results in table 5 are also interesting because they indicate that the efficient scale 
can change significantly from one region to another. The poorest regions (northeast and 
north) have minimum efficient scales larger than the richest regions (southeast and 
south). This means, for example, that in a private duopoly a client from southeast is 
equivalent to 1.6 clients from northeast. 
  
Robustness 2: Different Definitions of Market Size 
 
In this subsection we re-estimate model (5) for different market size definitions. 
The first change is marginal: market size is now defined as the total income of those who 
earn more than three minimum wages. The third definition of market size follows the 
spirit of BR. Market size is modeled as function of several variables. More specifically: 
 
Capita Per    Income
Growth   Negative Growth   Positive
Town   of out     to Commuters






















k S                (10) 
 
Commuters from out of town is the number of people that, although no living the 
city, work there. Commuters from out of town is the number of city residents that work 
somewhere else. Positive growth is a dummy that assumes 1 if the town’s population 
increased from 1990 to 2000, and negative growth is the reverse. The idea is simple. 
Given a certain population, the market size (for entry decision) should be larger the more 
people commute from out of town, the less people commute to out of town, the faster the 
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Capita Per    Income
Growth   Negative Growth   Positive
Town   of out     to Commuters
Town   of out    from   Commuters   Population
   (11)   24
Market size parameters ω  are estimated along with all parameters. Table 7 shows 
the estimated coefficients for the alternative market size definitions.  
   25













































** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
Source: Banco Central do Brasil and 2000  Census. 
Negative populational growth
† = Ordered probit estimates with market size defined as the total city income for those with 
income above three minimum wages. Robust standard deviations in parentheses
‡ = Ordered probit estimates of model (11). Robust standard deviations in parentheses
Table 7: Different Definitions of Market Size
*** = significant at the 1% level
Positive populational growth
Commuters in town from outside
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Again, the estimates in both columns of table 7 are very similar to those in table 4, 
which means that the results are robust to two different definitions of market size.
25 In 
column (2), one can see that, except for the estimated coefficient associated with the 
negative growth dummy, all other the estimates market size parameters have the expected 
sign (although the ones on the commuters are not precisely estimated.). Table 8 show the 




s 20 s 11
0.18 0.06
s 30 s 12 s 21
0.21 0.06 0.13
s 40 s 13 s 22 s 31
0.23 0.05 0.10 0.12
s 10
0.13
s 20 s 11
0.20 0.07
s 30 s 12 s 21
0.22 0.06 0.14
s 40 s 13 s 22 s 31
0.23 0.06 0.11 0.14
Table 8: Minimum efficient scale, modeling market size*
Panel A: Minimum efficient scale, 3 minimum wages
Panel B: Minimum efficient scale, BR scale
* s ij - minimum efficient scale with i private and j public banks. Minimum scales computed 
with estimates with column (1) column (2) in table 7.
 
Although remarkably robust, results in tables 5 to 8 are conditional on accepting 
the hypothesis that public bank presence is exogenous. Towns where the market structure 
is a public monopoly, or a duopoly with one public and one private bank, are (slightly) 
                                                 
25 As mentioned in footnote 12, the results in column (1) are not sensitive to other different definitions of 
market size (such as income of those who earn more than 2, 4 and 5 minimum wages), Results are available 
upon request.   27
poorer than those with a private monopoly and duopoly. This fact has two implications
26. 
On the one hand, it suggests that public banks have goals different than profit 
maximization, which helps interpreting results table 4 as evidence of different 
competitive effects by private and public banks. On the other hand, markets where public 
banks are present may be smaller for precisely this reason. The procedure implemented in 
the next sub-section attempts to account for systematic differences in towns according to 
the presence of public banks. 
 
III.B Splitting the sample 
 
In this sub-section we present estimates of the differential effect of public banks 
that do not require us to assume that public banks’ entry is exogenous. Instead, the effect 
is measured by comparing estimates from different samples. In one sample, we will use 
the whole sample of towns while in the second sample we will use the towns that have 
only private banks. To increase comparability, both samples are restricted to cities with 
no more than two banks since there are at most two private banks in cities with only 
private banks. Ownership, once used to select the samples, is ignored when estimating the 
parameter of the profit function. Let N
k  be the number of banks (both private and public) 
in market k, and let 
k
m D  be defined as before. The profit function is now: 
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1                                  (12) 
 
 
Note that this specification is a little different from (5): the number of public 
banks does not enter as an exogenous variable. The strategy now is to select difference 
sub-samples of cities, and infer the effect of public banks by the differences in estimated 
parameters across different these different sub-samples.   
                                                 
26 The income per capita average in towns with public monopoly is of R$151 while in towns with private 
monopoly it is R$175, an average difference of 15.9%.  For duopolies the figures are: an average of R$204 
for towns with one public and one private bank, and an average of R$209 for private duopolies, this mean a 
smaller average difference of 2.5%.    28
 
The sample is split in three different groups, according to their market structure. 
Group 1 is composed of cities where there is either a private monopoly or a private 
duopoly; group 2 is composed of cities where there is either a public monopoly or a 
public duopoly; finally, group 3, which is the closest to the ideal experiment described 
above, is composed of cities in which there is a public monopoly or a private-public 
duopoly.  The idea is quite simple. Suppose we randomly decided what cities would 
belong to each group. Difference in their behavior would then be interpretable as 
differences in the competitive drive. 




α 1 24.77 32.85 31.97
(3.08)*** (2.59)*** (2.44)***
α 2 -10.43 -13.10 -12.07
(1.09)*** (0.95)*** (0.97)***
γ 1 1.53 2.22 2.24
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
γ 2 1.16 0.34 0.49
(0.13)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)***
Income 3.62 -0.21 0.76
(0.43)*** (0.26) (0.23)***
Gini -27.26 -12.15 -13.15
(4.94)*** (3.91)*** (3.73)***
Table 9: Spliting the sample
Ordered probit estimates of the model (5), robust standard deviations in 
parentheses
Source: Banco Central do Brasil and 2000  Census. 
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
† = only private monopolies and dupolies in the sample
‡ = only public monopolies and dupolies in the sample
§ = only public monopolies and private-public dupolies in the sample
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There is one noticeable thing in the estimates. First, αs and γs continue to have the 
expected signs and magnitudes, and their pattern is quite similar across sub-groups, 
which suggests that looking at estimated parameters is uninformative. Public banks could 
have a significantly lower impact on competition and yet have a large impact on the 
profits of other public banks. Thresholds for the minimum scales, reported in table 10, are 
more informative. 
 
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.10 0.08
s 2 0.32 0.14
s 2/s 1 3.04 1.82
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.08
s 2 0.10 0.10
s 2/s 1 1.18 1.15
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.08
s 2 0.10 0.09
s 2/s 1 1.16 1.09
†††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (3)
Table 10: Minimum efficient scale for duopolies, spliting the sample*
Panel A: Only private monopolies and duopolies††
Panel B: Only public monopolies and duopolies†††
Panel C: Public monopolies and priva-public duopolies††††
‡ = Minimum scales evaluated at the overall average income per capita and Gini index.
* s i - minimum efficient scale with i banks.
† = Minimum scales evaluated at the average income per capita and Gini index for the group of cities in 
question.
†† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (1)
††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (2)
 
 
The difference among sub-samples is absolutely clear now. Start at panel A, and 
consider the first set of number (under the title Sample means). When the world is 
composed of only private banks, the relationship between market size and number of 
competitors is as expected: private duopolies are, on average, more than three times the 
size of private monopolies, This number imply two things: private banks are guided by 
the decision rule (3), and the second competitor has a strong effect on conduct. Consider   30
now panel B: when only public bank cities are considered the pattern hardly arises: public 
duopolies are only 18% larger than public banks, which implies that either public banks 
do not follow (3), or that their competitive effect is very limited. More interestingly, 
consider panel C. Private-Public bank duopolies are only 16% larger than public bank 
monopolies. The interpretation, in contrast to panel A, is the following. When faced with 
the prospect of competing with a public bank, a private bank waits until the market is 
16% than the average size of the public monopoly. When the prospect is facing with a 
private competitor, the entrant waits until the market is more than three times the size. 
This corroborates the previous results that suggested that private banks are more pro-
competitive than public banks. 
  
Robustness 1: Homogenizing the Samples 
 
One major concern about results in table 9-10 is than allocation of public and 
private banks is not random, as we would like it to be. Therefore, the sub-samples of 
towns with only private banks could be systematically different in dimensions pertinent 
to bank profits. In this sub-section we check whether the results are robust to 
homogenizing the sample.  
The first question that comes to mind is what explains the presence of public and 
private banks in the sample. To partially answer this question, we run a Logit procedure 
to relate city characteristics to the presence of public banks. Table 11 shows the results. 
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Sample of monopolies† Sample of duopolies‡
Dependent Variable = 1, if 
monopolist is public























# of observations 1334 559
Illiteracy rate
‡ = Sample composed of cities whose market structure is duopoly, private-private and public-public.










§ Robust standard deviations in paretheses
† = Sample composed of cities whose market structure is monopoly.
Source: Banco Central do Brasil and 2000  Census. 
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level




In the first column the sample is composed of monopolies, and the coefficient and 
the dependent variable is a dummy for public (as opposed to private) monopolies. Given 
that the market structure is a monopoly, the odds of it being a public monopoly increase 
if the city is located in the Northeast and if the city is located in a state whose state-
owned public bank was privatized, with the importance of farm product in the city, with 
the size of the city, and decreases with product. The last two facts were already suggested 
in table 2. The importance of farm product is a peculiarity of Brazil: Banco do Brasil, for   32
political reasons, has a major (possibly larger than economics would justify) in farm 
financing.  
Privatization is, not surprisingly, an important driving force. There are 13% 
private monopolies, 0.8% private duopolies, of a total sample of 4962 towns. Out of 
these, 76.6% are in the region south or southeast and 88% are in a state that had a state 
bank being privatized until the end of 2000
27. For private duopolies the figures are more 
striking: from the 41 private duopolies of the sample, 39 (95%) are in the south or 
southeast region
28. In November of 2000, Banco Santander bought the state-operated 
government owned bank BANESPA, one of the largest banks in Brazil, paying a very 
high premium, presumably to recruit a profitable client base of relatively wealthy public 
servants.
29 Indeed, all cities where BANESPA operated continued to be serviced by 
Santander in December 2001, roughly 13 months after privatization. This makes us 
confident that, Santander´s presence in a local market is indeed profit driven, not because 
it was too late for an exit strategy to be carried through.
30 For the 41 private duopolies in 
our sample, 16 were generated from BANESPA privatization. In October of 2000, the 
Itaú bank bought the state-operated government owned bank BANESTADO. This 
privatization gave us 14 private duopolies.   
Finally, the presence of public banks in the Northeast region is explained by the 
political strategy of the federal government in the last years of the military regime.
31 
When duopolies are concerned, the presence of public banks seems much more 
random, only related to whether privatization took place in the state. 
                                                 
27 The others states that had private banks being privatized were: Rio de Janeiro in June of 1997, Minas 
Gerais in September of 1998 and Paraná in October of 2000. For Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais we 
considered that the position of 2000 is already a good measure of the exit decision of the institutions that 
bought the local banks. For the state of Paraná we did the same treatment as for the state of São Paulo. We 
looked for the number of agencies in each town for the privatized institution in December of 2001.  
28  We did not make the robustness check for a single state because we did not have any state with 
sufficient number of observations for private duopolies.    
29 The price paid for Banespa was R$7,050 millions, which were at that time more than three times larger 
than Banespa’s equity.  At that time, the number of Banespa’s agencies was of 578. This large number of 
agencies was one of the main reasons for why the Santander paid such high price, since the purchase of 
Banespa was a cheap way to enter in the Brazilian market through branches in the richest state of the 
federation. 
30 In fact, three years after privatization Santander still serviced the same cities. 
31 Anticipating difficulties in more educated, more politicized urban places, the military, during the then 
inevitable transition to democracy, chose to favor rural, poorer places, where they could more easily 
establish a solid support base. Therefore the presence of Banco do Brasil in the Northeast cities.   33
  Table 11 suggests that there may be significant differences in cities where public 
and private banks operate, especially for monopoly cities. Therefore it is important to try 
to homogenize the samples somehow. Table 11 itself provides also provide one simple 
way in which the sample can be homogenized. Since privatization was more important in 
the South and the Southeast (see analysis above), and Banco do Brasil is particularly 
strong in the Northeast, we first restrict the three sub-samples to cities that belong to the 
South and Southeast regions. Besides the aforementioned reasons, this has the further 
advantage of homogenizing the sample in other dimensions, since the Southeast and the 
South are the most homogeneous regions in the country. Table 12 presents the results. 
 
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.06 0.08
s 2 0.10 0.12
s 2/s 1 1.55 1.61
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.08 0.08
s 2 0.07 0.07
s 2/s 1 0.92 0.93
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.08 0.08
s 2 0.08 0.08
s 2/s 1 1.02 1.03
‡ = Minimum scales evaluated at the overall average income per capita and Gini index.
Table 12: Minimum efficient scale for duopolies, south-southeast*
Panel A: Only private monopolies and duopolies
Panel B: Only public monopolies and duopolies
Panel C: Public monopolies and priva-public duopolies
† = Minimum scales evaluated at the average income per capita and Gini index for the group of cities in 
question.
* s i - minimum efficient scale with i banks. Minimum scale computed with estimates from the same 
models as table 9, except that the sample is restricted to the south and south-east regions
 
 
Inspection of table 12 shows that results are, in relative terms, very similar to 
those in table 10, which suggests that heterogeneity across cities is not driving results in 
table 10. The sample, however, can be homogenized in a more systematic way. Crump, 
Hotz, Imbens and Mitnik (2007) propose a method to deal with heterogeneity of   34
treatment and control groups when estimating average treatment effects. We adapt their 
procedure to the BR framework.  
The procedure consists of estimating the probability that an observation belongs 
to a group (the propensity score), commonly called the treatment group, as a function of 
observable explanatory variables. Then, the sample is “trimmed”: some observations are 
excluded on the basis of having propensity scores that are too high or too low. The idea is 
that, by excluding extremes, the remaining data would have similar possibilities of being 
part of group (treatment) or another (control). In case we want to select among towns 
with only private bank those that, given observables, also had a fair chance of having a 
public bank, and vice versa (towns with public banks with characteristics more close to 
the towns that have only private bank). The ideal experiment would be to select a random 
town and compare the same town with and without the public bank in order to measure 
the “treatment” public bank presence. In this case, all towns would a 50% chance of 
having only private banks. Trimming the sample emulates this ideal experiment. 
The procedure is as follows. In a first stage, we use the two logit models 
estimated to find predicted probabilities that a monopoly will be public, and a duopoly 
will contain only public banks.  The sample is then “trimmed” by excluding the towns 
with the top t  % and the bottom t % of propensity scores. We estimate model (10) 
excluding t = 5% and t =10%. The choice of t involves a trade-off. We would like trim 
the sample as much as possible. But we have only few observations of cities with only 
private banks. Tables 13 and 14 show the results of the 5% and 10% trimming 
procedures. 
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Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.10 0.08
s 2 0.21 0.12
s 2/s 1 2.03 1.54
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.08
s 2 0.08 0.08
s 2/s 1 0.91 1.00
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.09
s 2 0.09 0.09
s 2/s 1 1.00 1.00
Table 13: Minimum efficient scale for duopolies, 5% sample trimming*
Panel A: Only private monopolies and duopolies††
Panel B: Only public monopolies and duopolies†††
Panel C: Public monopolies and priva-public duopolies††††
††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (2)   but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.05,0.95) interval, from table 12.
†††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (3)   but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.05,0.95) interval, from table 12.
‡ = Minimum scales evaluated at the overall average income per capita and Gini index.
* s i - minimum efficient scale with i banks.
† = Minimum scales evaluated at the average income per capita and Gini index for the group of cities in question.
†† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (1)  but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.05,0.95) interval, from table 12.
 
 
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.10 0.08
s 2 0.22 0.12
s 2/s 1 2.11 1.55
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.09
s 2 0.08 0.08
s 2/s 1 0.89 0.89
Sample means† Fixed values‡
s 1 0.09 0.09
s 2 0.09 0.09
s 2/s 1 1.00 1.00
Table 14: Minimum efficient scale for duopolies, 10% sample trimming*
Panel A: Only private monopolies and duopolies††
Panel B: Only public monopolies and duopolies†††
Panel C: Public monopolies and priva-public duopolies††††
††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (2)   but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.10,0.90) interval, from table 12.
†††† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (3)   but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.10,0.90) interval, from table 12.
* s i - minimum efficient scale with i banks.
† = Minimum scales evaluated at the average income per capita and Gini index for the group of cities in question.
‡ = Minimum scales evaluated at the overall average income per capita and Gini index.
†† = Minimum scales computed with estimates in table 9, column (1)  but with sample restricted those with 
predicted probabilities (scores) in the (0.10,0.90) interval, from table 12.
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In this paper we measure the competitive effect of entry by public banks in local 
banking markets in Brazil by extending Bresnahan and Reiss’s [1991] framework to 
measure the entry’s effects. In our baseline estimations, where the public bank entry was 
considered exogenous, we find that, while markets whose structure is private bank 
duopoly are 100% larger than private monopolies, duopolies with one public and one 
private bank and private monopolies are no different with respect to market size. These 
results suggest that, while entry by private banks toughens competition, entry by public 
banks seem neutral to conduct. This result is robust to including regional differences, and 
demand controls.  
In the second procedure, entry by public banks is no longer assumed to be 
exogenous. The ordered probit is estimated for two samples of cities: one of towns where 
only private institutions serve the market, and the whole sample (including the markets 
where public banks are present).  The results corroborate the previous findings: private 
banks seem more pro-competitive than public banks. We also studied the entry process of 
public banks more closely in concentrated markets to understand what drives public bank 
presence vis-à-vis private bank entry. We find that some variables associated with the 
development view of public banks existence, like the proportion of rural production, help 
to explain why public banks enter in some cities that private banks are not willing to 
service. Using these results, the two samples were homogenized using a procedure 
proposed by Crump et. al. (2006), which excludes cities that are too dissimilar based on 
the probability of being part of one group (the propensity score). By combining BR`s 
method for measuring the effect of entry on competition with propensity score methods 
of homogenizing samples, we contribute methodologically to the empirical literature on 
entry effects. Results are in line with the previous procedure (exogenous public banks), 
and are themselves robust to another set of robustness checks.     37
The reason why private are more pro-competitive than public banks is still an 
open question. The theoretical predictions about the effects of public bank presence are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, consumer surplus maybe part of public banks’ objective 
function, and this would induce them to toughen competition. On the other hand, public 
banks may run a higher operation cost, because of poor management, and/or because they 
serve higher cost clients for development reasons. Our results suggest that the second 
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